# socks5901 - compromised PyPI versions

> socks5901 on PyPI has 1 version flagged in 1 tracked supply-chain incident. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. socks5901 was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

- Package: socks5901
- Ecosystem: PyPI
- Highest severity: high
- Kind: Advisory sweep
- Compromised versions: 1.0.0
- Check what you have installed: `pip show socks5901`

## The incident that flagged it

| Date | Severity | Kind | Incident | Versions named |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-18 | high | Advisory sweep | [GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-08-17 / 2026-08-18 batch (Sui blockchain `@mysten/*` typosquat days 4-5 continuation `sui-move-graphql`+`sui-move-rpc`+`sui-gql-core`+`bcs-core`+`bucket-protocol-sdk-v2`, Tinkoff BNPL dep-confusion tail `bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-search`, LEB128 encoding typosquat pair `leb128x`+`ulebkit`, generic CWE-506 boilerplate `blastradar`+`runtime-health`, PyPI Telegram-RAT trio `socks5901`+`infogram-bot`+`httpz-requests`)](https://dependencywatch.io/incident/multi-2026-08-18-ghsa-malware-sweep) | 1.0.0 |

## What to do if you installed one of these

1. Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.
2. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a *different* machine.
3. Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
4. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
5. Read the incident write-up linked above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

## Check your whole project

A compromised package is often a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your requirements.txt to check every dependency at once: https://dependencywatch.io/check/requirements-txt

All flagged PyPI packages: https://dependencywatch.io/package/pypi

## Other packages in the same incident

If socks5901 is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

- [bcs-core](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/bcs-core) (npm)
- [blastradar](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/blastradar) (npm)
- [bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-search](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-search) (npm)
- [bucket-protocol-sdk-v2](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/bucket-protocol-sdk-v2) (npm)
- [httpz-requests](https://dependencywatch.io/package/pypi/httpz-requests) (PyPI)
- [infogram-bot](https://dependencywatch.io/package/pypi/infogram-bot) (PyPI)
- [leb128x](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/leb128x) (npm)
- [runtime-health](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/runtime-health) (npm)
- [sui-gql-core](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/sui-gql-core) (npm)
- [sui-move-graphql](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/sui-move-graphql) (npm)
- [sui-move-rpc](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/sui-move-rpc) (npm)
- [ulebkit](https://dependencywatch.io/package/npm/ulebkit) (npm)

Full incident: https://dependencywatch.io/incident/multi-2026-08-18-ghsa-malware-sweep

## Sourcing

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Corrections: https://dependencywatch.io/submit

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Canonical page: https://dependencywatch.io/package/pypi/socks5901
Markdown version: https://dependencywatch.io/package/pypi/socks5901.md
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