visanduma/nova-two-factor has 4 compromised versions.

HighCompromisePackagist

visanduma/nova-two-factor has 4 versions on Packagist flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. visanduma/nova-two-factor is a legitimate package. Only the versions listed were malicious; other versions were not affected, but a lockfile that resolved to a listed version installed the payload.

Read the incident What to do

At a glancePackagist

Compromised versionsDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem: Packagist
Worst severity: High
Incidents: 1
First flagged: 17 Sept 2026
Type: Compromise

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with composer show visanduma/nova-two-factor.

visanduma/nova-two-factor@dev-using-inertia
visanduma/nova-two-factor@dev-nova5
visanduma/nova-two-factor@dev-nova4support
visanduma/nova-two-factor@dev-main

The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighCompromise17 Sept 2026

visanduma/nova-two-factor branches seeded with PolinRider malware

Socket disclosed on 2026-09-17 that the DPRK-linked PolinRider operators compromised the Visanduma GitHub organisation and implanted staged infostealer code in the dev-main, dev-nova4support, dev-using-inertia, and dev-nova5 branches of visanduma/nova-two-factor, a Laravel Nova 2FA package on Packagist with ~700K cumulative downloads. No stable release is affected; Packagist has frozen the package.

Versions named here: dev-main, dev-nova4support, dev-using-inertia, dev-nova5Read the incident →

What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency. We do not parse Packagist manifests yet, but the scanner checks npm and PyPI lockfiles and the incident write-ups list every affected package.

Scan a lockfile All Packagist packages