spotify-url-resolvers has 2 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. spotify-url-resolvers was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.
GHSA 2026-09-27 (late) + 2026-09-28: 23 new advisories - 8 pip + 15 npm. Cluster A extends yesterdays donutautosellsrc Polygon-blockchain-C2 campaign to 4 more pip packages sharing the same payload hash and attacker wallet. Cluster B scrapetools2` uses IPFS gateways for auto-update payload distribution. Cluster E is a 15-package npm CWE-506 boilerplate batch with no published analysis - likely a mix of typosquats, dep-confusion probes, and unknown-classification takedowns.
24 new GHSA malware advisories in the 24h window ending 2026-08-27. Highlights: npm hydration-vli-ui@1.0.0 ships a Linux x86_64 ELF disguised as JavaScript, on import establishes a full-featured RAT with SSH-key theft and systemd persistence; npm commonjs-code-token postinstall pulls a token from access-token-delta.vercel.app and eval()s it; npm spotify-url-resolvers archives the project directory (including .env) hourly to a Telegram bot; PyPI pybitjs is attributed to Lazarus/PolinRider with blockchain-based C2 delivery.
Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.
Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.
Same campaign
Other packages in the same incident
If spotify-url-resolvers is in your tree, these are worth checking too. They were published by the same campaign.
Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.
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Check every dependency, not just this one.
It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.