Highnpm1 affected version

solidity-hold

solidity-hold has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls solidity-hold.

  • solidity-hold@2.0.1

The incident that flagged it

High

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-08-19 batch (Sui `@mysten/*` typosquat continuation day 6 `sui-graphql-rpc`+`sui-gql-rpc` targeted git-config allowlist, Chinese exam-cheat surveillance suite `sysc1`+`syjoy`+`syboy`+`sysdo`, pino/jsonspack revival `chai-as-gateway`+`chaikit`+`solidity-hold`, Streak sibling typosquat `streak-key-lib`+`streak-cal-core` ELF dropper, txs SDK Caesar loader pair `txs-runner-sdk`+`txs-lib-sdk`, `@sarex-team/*` DNS exfil pair, deepface Telegram-session PyPI typosquat `deepface-weight`+`deepface-weights`, `reqcrypt` HTTP-response backdoor)

28 GHSA CWE-506 advisories in the 24h ending 2026-08-19 06:00 UTC. Headline: *Sui `@mysten/ typosquat day 6** (sui-graphql-rpc, sui-gql-rpc) with a **targeted git-config allowlist** payload - dormant in CI, only fires for hardcoded developer identities. Also: 4-package Chinese exam-cheat surveillance, jsonspack` pino-typosquat revival, and a PyPI deepface Telegram-session stealer.

Versions named here: 2.0.1

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

solidity-hold is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Other packages in the same incident

If solidity-hold is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.