signalledger-bridge has 1 compromised version.

HighMalicious packagenpm

signalledger-bridge has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. signalledger-bridge was malicious from its first publish. There is no legitimate version to roll back to; remove it entirely.

At a glancenpm
1
Compromised versionDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem
npm
Worst severity
High
Incidents
1
First flagged
20 Oct 2026
Type
Malicious package

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls signalledger-bridge.

  • signalledger-bridge@2.0.6
The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighMalicious package

tailwind Animate.css npm plugin cluster lures developers through fake job interviews

GitHub ingested 26 npm advisories (MAL-2026-18065 through MAL-2026-18090) on 2026-10-20 attributing a fake job interview supply-chain campaign tracked as MAL-2026-17665 / MAL-2026-17666 / MAL-2026-17667. The packages are Tailwind CSS plugins that reuse an identical Animate.css integration template and hide their payload inside a private scoped dependency (@aaron205whitmore/postcss-animate-utils or @jasperquinn/postcss-motion-helpers) that resolves only when a candidate clones the lure repo whose web/.npmrc carries an npm token.

Versions named here: 2.0.6Read the incident →
What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
  2. Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.