publish-poc-base has 1 compromised version.

HighAdvisory sweepnpm

publish-poc-base has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. publish-poc-base was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

Check my package-lock.json What to do

At a glancenpm

Compromised versionDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem: npm
Worst severity: High
Incidents: 1
First flagged: 27 Oct 2026
Type: Advisory sweep

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls publish-poc-base.

publish-poc-base@1.0.7

The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighAdvisory sweep27 Oct 2026

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 27 October 2026

GHSA 2026-10-26 late batch (~50 advisories post the 2026-10-26 sweep cut-off). Headlines: npm @walknpm/todo-cli + dsh-plugin-blender-3d XMRig cryptominer wave 2 of the @sudobility 2026-10-22 campaign (byte-identical scripts/miner.sh to @sudobility/testomniac_client MAL-2026-18129, same networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 Monero pool); npm publish-poc-base + publish-poc-test3 worm-POC (registry self-propagation via fabricated publish-poc-found-* packages published under the installers own npm token); PyPI netweavex NetworkX typosquat with import-time GitHub-hosted RCE (kam193 campaign 2026-10-netweavex, OSSF MALICIOUS); new npm @iobandamwer/* scope; path-stream-utils-testmetest sibling of yesterdays event-bus-lite-testmetest Bun-runtime loader; kam193 PyPI pentest singles zagents-framework + changes-lxc-wrapper; plus CWE-506 boilerplate long tail.

Versions named here: 1.0.7Read the incident →

What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Same campaign

Other packages in the same incident

If publish-poc-base is in your tree, these are worth checking too. They were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident →All flagged npm packages →

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

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