HighAdvisory sweepnpm6 affected versions

my-baileys

my-baileys has 6 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

my-baileys was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls my-baileys.

  • my-baileys@1.0.5
  • my-baileys@1.0.4
  • my-baileys@1.0.3
  • my-baileys@1.0.2
  • my-baileys@1.0.1
  • my-baileys@*

The 2 incidents that flagged it

High

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-10-09 (xwise8887 wave-2 continuation `wie888r`/`testrrrd`/`xblaxw`/`@wxwxtest/testrrrdd` to `185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`; Wix dep-confusion cluster `wix-reg-poc-bypass` (webhook.site) + `css-overscroll-contain` (dxpoc.gt.tc, K8s SA-token theft + container escape); `pxnpm` nfjbill-operator npm proxy weaponization (same operator as 2026-08 `yakuza0`); 16-package `@bellaxchuu/*` + sibling Baileys-themed lure cluster; 6-package `@dransay/*` oast.site dep-confusion probes; `@bitwardne/*` 2-package Bitwarden typosquat; 5-package `@galicia-toolkit/*`+`@design-system-coopeuch/web` dep-confusion cluster; 9 dev-tooling typosquats; 2 pypi `kafka-roller`/`kafka-helmsman` 99.x dep-confusion probes; plus standalones)

GHSA 2026-10-09: 50 fresh malware advisories across 10 clusters (48 npm, 2 pypi). Headline items: continuation of the xwise8887 dep-confusion operator (wie888r/testrrrd/xblaxw/@wxwxtest/testrrrdd beaconing to the same 185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc endpoint as yesterday); Wix dep-confusion cluster including css-overscroll-contain which carries K8s service-account token theft and container-escape payload; and pxnpm npm proxy weaponization from the same operator (nfjbill.ren) as the 2026-08 yakuza0@2.23.40 malicious release.

Versions named here: *

High

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-10-01 (late) + 2026-10-02 (npm Baileys silent WhatsApp follow mass batch, 15 siblings sharing query ID `7871414976211147`: `@xayz/baileys`, `xvinleys`, `yonzoffic-baileys`, `xzbails`, `xzvexpzcbailey`, `yonzofficial`, `kiyoramarkets`, `kasabaileys`, `my-baileys`, `lilys-baileys`, `noxleyss`, `syncxbails`, `whalibmob`, `ishumdz-bail`, `eliteprotech-baileys`; pip `spo365-graph` NEW campaign - AWS Lambda deploy + AWS Secrets Manager credential theft; pip `friendly-tools` Snowflake credential-theft `friendly-greeting-tools` family continuation; pip `shortneer` Chrome-extension crypto-wallet + Telegram infostealer (`sherpy` campaign continuation); npm `future-scripts` browser DoS `boom()` time-bomb detonating 2026-10-10; npm `online-header@99.0.0` sentinel-version malicious-domain beacon; 5 npm CWE-506 boilerplate takedowns `illusion-datalab`, `homestack-cheer`, `kartykgithub-ph-f`, `kartykgithub-ph-e`, `kartykgithub-ph-b`)

GHSA 2026-10-01 (late) + 2026-10-02: 26 new advisories (23 npm + 3 pip). Confirmed payloads: 15 npm Baileys silent-WhatsApp-follow siblings (jexkcode/noverojs family); pip spo365-graph AWS Lambda + Secrets Manager credential theft (new); pip friendly-tools Snowflake exfil; pip shortneer Chrome-wallet stealer; npm future-scripts browser DoS time-bomb set for 2026-10-10.

Versions named here: 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

my-baileys is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Other packages in the same incident

If my-baileys is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.