joko-klanting28-sluey has 1 compromised version.

HighAdvisory sweepnpm

joko-klanting28-sluey has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. joko-klanting28-sluey was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

Check my package-lock.json What to do

At a glancenpm

Compromised versionDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem: npm
Worst severity: High
Incidents: 1
First flagged: 14 Sept 2026
Type: Advisory sweep

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls joko-klanting28-sluey.

joko-klanting28-sluey@*

The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighAdvisory sweep14 Sept 2026

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 14 September 2026

GHSA 2026-09-13/14: PyPI chroma-client extends the 2026-09-openaii typosquat wave (chromadb typosquat, same infostealer+cryptominer payload as openaii/langgrap/transfomers/ollamaa); PyPI python-fork is a plain import-time fork bomb; npm job-iteration flagged as CWE-506 malware. Otherwise the day is a massive tea.xyz autopublish spam wave — hundreds of joko-{Indonesian food}-{suffix} names sourced from joan-teadev/joknmax autopublish scripts, plus joint_*_z3n/joint_*_0xrequest continuation of the 2026-09-11 family_*_z3n operator and joker123/joker388 casino-themed spam.

Versions named here: *Read the incident →

What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Same campaign

Other packages in the same incident

If joko-klanting28-sluey is in your tree, these are worth checking too. They were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident →All flagged npm packages →

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

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