google-internal-cloud-audit-security-check has 1 compromised version.

HighAdvisory sweepnpm

google-internal-cloud-audit-security-check has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. google-internal-cloud-audit-security-check was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

At a glancenpm
1
Compromised versionDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem
npm
Worst severity
High
Incidents
1
First flagged
3 Sept 2026
Type
Advisory sweep

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls google-internal-cloud-audit-security-check.

  • google-internal-cloud-audit-security-check@0.0.0
The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighAdvisory sweep

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 3 September 2026

19-package sweep: Panther-tracked frengki0707 "Frankly Malicious" actor resurfaces with 10 apple-/google-/frank- dep-confusion drops after ~4 months. PyPI 2026-09-telemetry-helper campaign exfils env-vars to GitHub Gist via hardcoded PAT. `@stellarshift/ (4 pkgs) targets Lark/Feishu+FortiClient endpoints; tailwindcss-fluid-styles` uses CHAINDROP on-chain Ethereum C2.

Versions named here: 0.0.0Read the incident →
What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
  2. Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.