fuels-typegen has 2 compromised versions.

HighAdvisory sweepnpm

fuels-typegen has 2 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. fuels-typegen was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

At a glancenpm
2
Compromised versionsDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem
npm
Worst severity
High
Incidents
2
First flagged
31 Aug 2026
Last flagged
1 Sept 2026
Type
Advisory sweep

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls fuels-typegen.

  • fuels-typegen@1.0.0
  • fuels-typegen@0.0.0
The incidents

The 2 incidents that flagged it

HighAdvisory sweep

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 1 September 2026

19-pkg @yane88/* scope probes internal Windows dev-tool naming; PyPI pyservercheck@0.1.x is a PolinRider EtherHiding stager (.pth persistence, blockchain C2); fuels-* (4) typosquats Fuel Labs SDK; verify-contract-*/generate-schema-* (4) targets viem+ethers verifiers; bamru is a clipboard/screen harvester (C2 new-pointer.vercel.app); PyPI gcphelpit is an infostealer.

Versions named here: 0.0.0Read the incident →
HighAdvisory sweep

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 31 August 2026

Wave 3 of the grafeno-* Brazilian-fintech campaign lands as grafeno-actions@999.0.0 - a pure dependency-confusion pivot after Waves 1-2's pre-install payload. Alongside it: a Deutsche Bank Autobahn Electron dep-confusion probe (2 pkgs), a 6-pkg web3 typosquat cluster (fuels-* / verify-contract-* / generate-schema-*), a PyPI Tronix drain, and 12 late-arriving 2026-08-30 advisories.

Versions named here: 1.0.0Read the incident →
What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
  2. Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.