HighAdvisory sweepnpm1 affected version

chai-as-relay

chai-as-relay has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

chai-as-relay was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls chai-as-relay.

  • chai-as-relay@1.2.1

The incident that flagged it

High

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-09-26 (late) + 2026-09-27 (pip `donutautosellsrc` steganographic infostealer + Polygon-blockchain C2 resolver; pip `requests-cache-utils` `setup.py` remote-EXE downloader/browser-data infostealer; npm `chai-as-relay` `pino` impersonator with 4.4MB obfuscated IIFE loaded on import; npm `cma-self-hosted-sandbox-cf` preinstall `/etc/passwd`+`/etc/hosts`+DNS recon exfil to `oastify.com` OOB. No fresh `ltidi.storage.googleapis.com` or `algamil7x` variants in the window)

GHSA 2026-09-26 (late) + 2026-09-27: 4 new advisories - 2 pip + 2 npm not caught by yesterdays sweep. Worst confirmed items are pip donutautosellsrc (steganographic loader + Polygon-blockchain-resolved C2 + native infostealer) and pip requests-cache-utils (setup.py-installed remote EXE + browser data exfil). npm chai-as-relay impersonates pino and loads a 4.4MB obfuscated IIFE on import. npm cma-self-hosted-sandbox-cf preinstall harvests /etc/passwd+/etc/hosts`+DNS config to a Burp Collaborator OOB host.

Versions named here: 1.2.1

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

chai-as-relay is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Other packages in the same incident

If chai-as-relay is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.