@lekzo/baileys has no safe version.

HighAdvisory sweepnpm

At least one advisory flags @lekzo/baileys on the npm registry as malicious in every release, so the releases other advisories named are not the whole story. There is no version to upgrade to: remove it outright. It is named in 2 incidents we track. @lekzo/baileys was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

At a glancenpm
None
Safe versionsRemove it, do not upgrade

No release of this package is known good. If it is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem
npm
Worst severity
High
Incidents
2
First flagged
18 Sept 2026
Last flagged
13 Oct 2026
Type
Advisory sweep

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Version data

No release is known good. Including the releases the advisories named below.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @lekzo/baileys.

The source advisories flagged the package itself rather than particular releases. Treat any resolved version as malicious and remove the dependency; there is nothing to upgrade to.

  • @lekzo/baileys@0.0.1
The incidents

The 2 incidents that flagged it

HighAdvisory sweep

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 13 October 2026

GHSA 2026-10-12 batch (ingested 2026-10-13): ~90 fresh malware advisories, dominated by a Baileys/libsignal lure operator wave 3 of 60+ WhatsApp-automation-brand typosquats (continuation of 2026-10-10 Cluster C). Confirmed payloads: PyPI npp-ml Notepad++ impersonator deploying ADExplorer, PyPI minecraftaccfinder multi-platform infostealer+RAT, RubyGems wallet-balance-scanner fake-native-extension reverse shell. Plus @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b continuing s4yhii wave 3 and 25+ dep-confusion sentinel probes.

Versions named here: *Read the incident →
HighAdvisory sweep

GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 18 September 2026

GHSA 2026-09-17 late + 2026-09-18: 4x npm Baileys-fork packages redirect libsignal to unpinned GitHub refs for install-time RCE; blue-string-formatter-utils runs xss.report XMLHttpRequest+eval on require; @railone/image-utils reuses the api.npoint.io loader pattern of process-lhpm/process-mite; tailwindcss-form-* typosquats fetch commands from an attacker-authored Ethereum address; pip marketing-mcp exfils ~/.ssh/id_rsa + ~/.aws/credentials via a webhook.site endpoint.

Versions named here: 0.0.1Read the incident →
What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
  2. Remove the dependency: no release is known good, so there is nothing to pin to. Reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.