HighAdvisory sweepnpm3 affected versions

@design-system-coopeuch/web

@design-system-coopeuch/web has 3 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

@design-system-coopeuch/web was recorded in a daily advisory sweep. The write-up groups it into a cluster with the evidence available at the time; check the cluster note before treating it as a confirmed compromise.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @design-system-coopeuch/web.

@design-system-coopeuch/web@999.0.4
@design-system-coopeuch/web@999.0.0
@design-system-coopeuch/web@*

The 2 incidents that flagged it

High9 Oct 2026

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-10-09 (xwise8887 wave-2 continuation `wie888r`/`testrrrd`/`xblaxw`/`@wxwxtest/testrrrdd` to `185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`; Wix dep-confusion cluster `wix-reg-poc-bypass` (webhook.site) + `css-overscroll-contain` (dxpoc.gt.tc, K8s SA-token theft + container escape); `pxnpm` nfjbill-operator npm proxy weaponization (same operator as 2026-08 `yakuza0`); 16-package `@bellaxchuu/` + sibling Baileys-themed lure cluster; 6-package `@dransay/` oast.site dep-confusion probes; `@bitwardne/` 2-package Bitwarden typosquat; 5-package `@galicia-toolkit/`+`@design-system-coopeuch/web` dep-confusion cluster; 9 dev-tooling typosquats; 2 pypi `kafka-roller`/`kafka-helmsman` 99.x dep-confusion probes; plus standalones)

GHSA 2026-10-09: 50 fresh malware advisories across 10 clusters (48 npm, 2 pypi). Headline items: continuation of the xwise8887 dep-confusion operator (wie888r/testrrrd/xblaxw/@wxwxtest/testrrrdd beaconing to the same 185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc endpoint as yesterday); Wix dep-confusion cluster including css-overscroll-contain which carries K8s service-account token theft and container-escape payload; and pxnpm npm proxy weaponization from the same operator (nfjbill.ren) as the 2026-08 yakuza0@2.23.40 malicious release.

Versions named here: *

High28 Jul 2026

GitHub Advisory npm CWE-506 mega-sweep - 54-package sample from the 2026-07-27 → 2026-07-28 batch (8-package Ethereum-tooling `curl|bash` typosquat cluster, chalk / express / prettier / prisma / dotenv / chai-as-promised typosquat pairs, "helper/utils/tool/pack" credential+wallet-stealer family, 13-package dep-confusion cluster with `999.x` / `19999.x` / `99.99.99` version-inflation, Shai-Hulud-style preinstall Bun stealer resurgence, `@vaultflow/*` 2026-07-28 pair, `claude-code-base-action` Anthropic typosquat)

GitHub Advisory Database published a mega-batch of 250+ new npm CWE-506 malware advisories on 2026-07-27 (spanning 12+ paginated result pages), plus 2 more on 2026-07-28 (@vaultflow/create-flow, @vaultflow/update-flow). This module catalogues 54 non-@antv non-previously-tracked packages from the batch. Notable clusters: 8-package Ethereum-tooling curl|bash operator (web3-core-js, truffle-js, truffle-helper, solc-helper, hardhat-core, ethers-common, ethers-io, cdp-core), typosquat pairs (chalk-*, exxpress-*, prettier-lint-lenz, prisma-callback, env-threads), dep-confusion with inflated version numbers (999.x, 19999.x, 99.99.99), and Shai-Hulud-style preinstall Bun credential stealers on mcp-echarts, mcp-mermaid, ai-figure, gantt-for-react, amapcn, boring-avatars-vanilla, jest-canvas-mock, @cap-js/openapi.

Versions named here: 999.0.0, 999.0.4

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

@design-system-coopeuch/web is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All flagged npm packages

Other packages in the same incident

If @design-system-coopeuch/web is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.