@asyncapi/generator-components has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.
@asyncapi/generator-components is a legitimate package. Only the versions listed were malicious; other versions were not affected, but a lockfile that resolved to a listed version installed the payload.
Affected versions
Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @asyncapi/generator-components.
On 2026-07-14 an attacker exploited a pull_request_target misconfiguration in asyncapi/generator to steal a highly-privileged GitHub PAT, then published five malicious @asyncapi/* releases through the project's own trusted GitHub Actions release pipeline - valid npm OIDC provenance and all. The payload fires on require(), spawns a detached Node process, fetches an 8.25 MB IPFS loader (Miasma), and installs a 3.09 MB implant with six independent C2 channels (HTTP, Nostr, IPFS, BitTorrent DHT, libp2p GossipSub, Ethereum smart contract). Combined weekly downloads: ~2.9M.
Versions named here: 0.7.1
What to do if you installed one of these
Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.
1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.
Check your whole project
@asyncapi/generator-components is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.
Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.
