@apexacc/cli has 1 compromised version.

HighMalicious packagenpm

@apexacc/cli has 1 version on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. @apexacc/cli was malicious from its first publish. There is no legitimate version to roll back to; remove it entirely.

At a glancenpm
1
Compromised versionDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem
npm
Worst severity
High
Incidents
1
First flagged
19 Oct 2026
Type
Malicious package

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @apexacc/cli.

  • @apexacc/cli@*
The incident

The incident that flagged it

HighMalicious package

Apex Accelerator fake Web3 accelerator ships malicious apexacc npm packages

Elastic Security Labs (REF8801, 2026-10-12) attributes npm packages @apexacc/cli and @apexacc/audit to a fake Web3 accelerator ("Apex Accelerator" / Apex Arena) that lured crypto founders with free AI credits and audits. @apexacc/cli is a repackaged Oh My Pi coding agent that hijacks OpenRouter traffic, drops a macOS credential-stealer (CloudSyncD) and a Windows staged infostealer exfiltrating over Telegram. @apexacc/audit is an MCP server that returns fabricated security findings. GHSA indexed both on 2026-10-19.

Versions named here: *Read the incident →
What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
  2. Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.
Same campaign

Other packages in the same incident

If @apexacc/cli is in your tree, these are worth checking too. They were published by the same campaign.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.