@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen has 10 compromised versions.

CriticalCompromisenpm

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen has 10 versions on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories. @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen is a legitimate package. Only the versions listed were malicious; other versions were not affected, but a lockfile that resolved to a listed version installed the payload.

Check my package-lock.json What to do

At a glancenpm

Compromised versionsDo not install these

If one is in your tree, treat the machine as compromised, not just out of date.

Ecosystem: npm
Worst severity: Critical
Incidents: 1
First flagged: 28 Aug 2026
Type: Compromise

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page.

Affected versions

The exact releases to look for.

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen.

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@3.0.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@3.0.3
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@2.2.2
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@2.2.1
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@1.6.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@1.6.3
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.5.5
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.5.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be

The incident

The incident that flagged it

CriticalCompromise28 Aug 2026

Trinitite worm compromises @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen on npm

On 2026-08-28 an attacker published 10 malicious versions of @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen (~150K npm weekly downloads) in a ~20-minute window. Root cause: an issue_comment-triggered GitHub Actions release workflow without an author-association gate - any GitHub user could open a fork PR, comment npm publish, and the pipeline checked out the fork, ran pnpm install (executing the attacker's preinstall hook) with id-token: write and minted an npm OIDC trusted-publishing token to ship the poisoned versions. Payload is a "Trinitite: Sponsored by Preview 2 Effects" credential-stealer worm continuing the Mini Shai-Hulud / TeamPCP lineage.

Versions named here: 0.5.4, 0.5.5, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.0.3, 3.0.4, 0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be, 0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0abRead the incident →

What to do

Installed one of these? Start here.

Treat the machine as compromisedUpgrading is not enough. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach, such as registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys and CI secrets, from a different machine.
Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
Read the incident write-up. Recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth searching your logs for.

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name and do not infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.

Check your whole project

Check every dependency, not just this one.

It is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All npm packages