Criticalnpm10 affected versions

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen has 10 versions on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen.

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@3.0.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@3.0.3
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@2.2.2
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@2.2.1
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@1.6.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@1.6.3
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.5.5
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.5.4
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab
@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen@0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be

The incident that flagged it

Critical28 Aug 2026

`@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen` compromised - "Trinitite" (Mini Shai-Hulud continuation) worm published 10 poisoned versions via a fork PR + `issue_comment` trigger without an author-association gate

On 2026-08-28 an attacker published 10 malicious versions of @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen (~150K npm weekly downloads) in a ~20-minute window. Root cause: an issue_comment-triggered GitHub Actions release workflow without an author-association gate - any GitHub user could open a fork PR, comment npm publish, and the pipeline checked out the fork, ran pnpm install (executing the attacker's preinstall hook) with id-token: write and minted an npm OIDC trusted-publishing token to ship the poisoned versions. Payload is a "Trinitite: Sponsored by Preview 2 Effects" credential-stealer worm continuing the Mini Shai-Hulud / TeamPCP lineage.

Versions named here: 0.5.4, 0.5.5, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.0.3, 3.0.4, 0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be, 0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

@7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All flagged npm packages

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.