GitHub Advisory malware sweep, 2 November 2026

MediumAdvisory sweepnpmRubyGems

6 packages from GitHub malware advisories published between 06:00 UTC on 1 November and 06:00 UTC on 2 November 2026: two Baileys WhatsApp forks with an unpinned off-registry dependency, one out-of-band DNS probe and three CWE-506 takedowns. No confirmed payload beyond probes.

Published 2 Nov 2026 · Updated 6 Nov 2026

At a glancemulti-2026-11-02-ghsa-malware-sweep
6
Packages tracked7 malicious versions

Every version named by the advisory is in the scanner, so a lockfile check finds it directly.

Severity
Medium
Type
Advisory sweep
Published
2 Nov 2026
Last updated
6 Nov 2026
Ecosystems
npmRubyGems
Detected by
GitHub Advisory Database, OpenSSF Package Analysis, Amazon Inspector
Also known as
GHSA 2026-11-02 batch

Advisory sweep. A dated batch of GitHub Advisory Database malware entries collected together. A sweep mixes kinds - typosquats, dependency-confusion probes, boilerplate takedowns with no published analysis, and occasionally real payloads - and its severity reflects the worst confirmed item, not the batch as a whole.

What happened

The full picture

GitHub published malware advisories for 6 packages in this window (npm and RubyGems). It is a quiet day: the only analysed items are two Baileys forks with an unpinned dependency and a DNS callback probe.

Indicators named in the advisories

  • npmp19n5--768.oob.awss.dev (out-of-band probe callback)

Severity is medium because nothing in the batch has a confirmed payload beyond a beacon.

dependency-confusion
Affected packages

6 packages 7 versions

These are usually pulled in as transitive dependencies rather than installed directly. Check your whole tree at once. It runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Impact

What it does if you installed it

  • Cluster: trojanised Baileys WhatsApp library forks (malicious-package; advisory analysis published) (2 packages): @axo_cuy/baileys, @bil-rgb/baileys. Forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that pull their libsignal dependency straight from a personal GitHub repository with no pinned commit, so whoever controls that repository decides what runs on install. Use the official @whiskeysockets/baileys only.
  • Cluster: dependency-confusion and pentest probes (dependency-confusion; beacon only) (1 package): @an1mshnpmb9c84920/pipeprobe-obf-m19n5. These send only host details (hostname, username, working directory) to a callback host, mostly under internal-looking or squatted names at inflated versions. No payload beyond the beacon was reported, but a hit means your build resolved a public package where you expected a private one.
  • Cluster: CWE-506 takedowns with no published analysis (malicious-package; likely probes or lures) (3 packages): atlassian-wallboard-plugin, dsh-screenshot-native, macs-shoaibs-pro17. GitHub published only its standard "treat the host as compromised" notice for these, with no payload analysis.
What to do

Clean-up steps

  1. Check your lockfiles - search package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements*.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock and Gemfile.lock for every package and version listed below, or upload them to the DependencyWatch scanner
  2. Probes and spam - remove the package, rebuild, and check whether your registry configuration lets public packages shadow internal or scoped names
  3. Egress - DNS lookups to *.oob.awss.dev from build hosts indicate a probe ran
References

Sources

multi-2026-11-02-ghsa-malware-sweepBack to incidentsSubmit a correction
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